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WHAT IS MEANT BY FREEDOM? 
 
Paul D. Callister 
 
Introduction – Reflections on “Purpose” and 
“Freedom to” 
 
In 1955, in a neglected article in the Harvard Law Review 
entitled Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, Lon L. Fuller 
provided a framework for the basic definition of freedom.1  
More importantly, he tendered a question about the conditions 
of a free society:  “How can the freedom of human beings be 
affected or advanced by social arrangements, that is, by laws, 
customs, institutions, or other forms of social order that can be 
changed or preserved by purposive human actions?”2  This is 
the critical question this article addresses through constructing 
a comprehensive definition by first, considering etymology and 
then establishing the various modalities in which freedom 
operates.  These modalities include the space defined by the 
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 1. Lon L. Fuller, Freedom – A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305 
(1955).  From one of the only articles to treat Fuller’s article at any length, 
“[h]is important contribution has not been considered as part of this debate[,] 
[the defense of freedom], partly because Fuller published it prior to the report 
of the Wolfenden Committee, and partly because Fuller made his 
contribution part of a larger and more complex system of thinking about law.”  
Robert C.L. Moffat, “Not the Law’s Business:” The Politics of Tolerance and 
the Enforcement of Morality, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1111 (2005).  The 
significance of Fuller’s essay on Freedom is suggested by its inclusion in a 
very short bibliography by the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  See P.H. 
Partridge, Freedom, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 221, 225 (1967). 
2. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1309. 
1
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rule of law and various antithetical non-rule-of-law states, the 
role of democracy and representative government in disparate 
levels of society, the importance of rights as trumps on power, 
and the challenges posed by social justice.  Finally, Fuller’s 
question raises the issue of “laws, customs, institutions [and] 
other forms of social order,”3 all of which luminaries such as 
John Stuart Mill saw as unfortunate, but necessary, evils when 
considering freedom.4  Rather than necessary evils, this article 
will consider the productive role ascribed to law and 
institutions by Scott Shapiro, who views law as a form of social 
planning that effectuates choices, thus enhancing freedom.5 
Prior to constructing a definition of freedom, however, it is 
important to understand Lon Fuller’s conceptualization of 
freedom because of its value as a framework for any definition.  
Fuller draws a sharp distinction between “freedom to,” which 
implies choice among a range of alternatives, and “freedom 
from,” which Fuller points out can accommodate any ideology 
no matter how antithetical to human choice.6  For example, 
“freedom from” can be applied to freedom from capitalist 
exploitation or colonialism or, in more recent terms, from 
Western ideological imperialism (with charges such as Twitter 
being an “information weapon” serving U.S. political ends).7  
“The objectives of the welfare state and of Buddhism can with 
equal facility be stated in terms of ‘freedom from,’ the one 
promising freedom from poverty, the other freedom from the 
desire for worldly goods.”8  In the extreme, as identified by 
 
3. Id. 
4. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.  “The second great defect 
in Mill’s essay . . . lies in his assumption that all formal social 
arrangements—whether legal, customary, institutional, or contractual—are 
limitations on freedom, that is, restrictions on choice.”  Fuller, supra note 1, 
at 1312. 
5. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.  
6. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1305-07.  
7. Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon,’ NPR 
(Sept. 23, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://tinyurl.com/2fj5rsu (“They [undisclosed 
countries including Russia] see information as a weapon. An official from one 
of those countries told me [James Lewis, adviser to U.N. Institute for 
Disarmament Research that] Twitter is an American plot to destabilize 
foreign governments. That’s what they think. And so they’re asking, ‘How do 
we get laws that control the information weapon?’”). 
8. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1306. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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Fuller, it can even mean “freedom from freedom.”9 
Fuller’s framework is grounded in the “freedom to,” and in 
particular, “the [social] objective of keeping alive the creative, 
choosing, and purposive side of man’s nature.”10  Fuller admits 
that by exalting the “purposive” side of man’s nature, he is at 
odds with the sciences, both physical and social, of his time, 
which deny the purposive,11 but he does not care.  
Mathematical and mechanical relations are not best described 
in terms of purpose, but “[e]xcept on trivial levels, we have not 
discovered in human behavior mechanical or mathematical 
relationships that will enable us to predict invariant 
happenings.  In so far as we are able to make sense out of 
human behavior in its larger aspects, it is still in terms of 
purpose[.]”12  In his construct, purpose and “freedom to” choose 
among an array of choices that are closely linked.  “[I]t is easy 
to see why ‘freedom to’ should have become so unpopular—it 
savors too plainly of purpose.  On the other hand, ‘freedom 
from’ fits unobtrusively into the language of science.”13  While 
“freedom to” and purpose may have been less popular in the 
science of the 1950s, their status today is even less certain: 
  
 
9. Id. at 1313. 
10. Id. at 1314. 
11. Id. at 1308 n.2 (explaining B.F. Skinner’s criticism of purpose). 
12. Id. at 1308. 
13. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1309. 
3
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FIGURE 1—GOOGLE NGRAM OF “FREEDOM TO” AND “ 
“FREEDOM FROM” 
 
As the Google Ngram in  
Figure 1 suggests,14 today we actually use “freedom to” 
more than “freedom from” (at least in print), and we use it 
more than at the time Fuller wrote his article when, in 1955, 
the use of “freedom from” actually exceeded the use of “freedom 
to.”  Whether this means that conceptions of freedom comport 
more with Fuller’s notions than the concept abandoned as 
irrelevant by Skinner and others in the social sciences is 
difficult to say.15 
Exploring the concept of freedom more completely, Fuller’s 
framework has three “significant contexts”: 
 
(1) the absence of nullifying restraints and (2) 
the presence of some appropriate form of order 
that will carry the effects of individual decision 
over into the processes of society.  There is a 
third requisite for freedom that is both more 
difficult to state and more difficult to realize.  It 
 
14. For Google Ngram results for “freedom to” and “freedom from,” see 
http://tinyurl.com/pyeubrd.  
15. See supra note 11.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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may be suggested by saying that, to become 
effective, freedom requires a congenial 
environment of rules and decisions.16 
 
Against this framework of contexts, answers to the question 
posed in the introductory paragraph above are to be tested, 
including the expansive definition of freedom in this article. 
 
Meaning of Freedom—A Working Definition 
 
With Fuller’s framework for freedom as the backdrop, this 
article dares to press further and posit a definition that 
answers his question about what types of institutions and 
social arrangements can facilitate freedom.  Consequently, this 
article posits that freedom is a certain kind of relationship that 
exists between individuals and their kin, tribe, religious 
society, city, state, sovereign, or other body politic under 
conditions in which (1) such body is subject to the rule of law 
with real checks on power such that “legal standards be 
general, promulgated, clear, prospective, consistent, satisfiable, 
stable, and applied”;17 (2) there exists democratic and 
representative government at all pertinent levels of community 
in which the individual is engaged and by which arrangements 
the individual’s actions may from time to time be legitimately 
directed;18 (3) fundamental human rights are not only 
expressed in the Constitution and law, but operate as trumps 
on the will of the majority or sovereign; and (4) the general 
welfare or social justice is sufficiently observed that the 
exercise of fundamental rights and privileges is meaningful, 
 
16. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1314. 
17. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 394 (Belknap Press 2011).  These 
principles are based upon a famous analogy used by Lon Fuller, in which 
principles are taken from the deconstruction of the failure of a fictional King 
Rex to rule his kingdom.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39 
(rev. ed. 1969). 
18. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1314-15 (discussing the relationship between 
decisions made by an individual and made for the individual, including the 
need for “consultation” of the individual in decisions made for him or her).  “If 
individual freedom is to be meaningful, the decisions that are made for the 
individual must be congruent with, and form a suitable framework for, his 
own decisions.”  Id. at 1314. 
5
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but such rights and privileges are not suppressed by attempts 
to serve general welfare or social justice.  Each of the four parts 
of the definition is referred to as a modality or mode, meaning, 
from the Oxford English Dictionary, “a particular form, 
manner, or variety in which some quality, phenomenon, or 
condition occurs or is manifested.”19  In the sense used in this 
article, freedom is not absence from restraint, which is often 
the counterfeit of freedom.  In its truest sense, freedom is 
similar to citizenship, with both attendant rights and 
obligations.  Laws and institutions can play a critical role in 
defining and economizing choices to heighten, rather than 
subvert, freedom.  This article shall consider fundamental 
human rights to include not only such fundamental rights as 
expressed in the American federal and state constitutions and 
the decisions of courts interpreting the same, but such 
additional rights as may exist in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,20 or by other recognized sources of law.  Just 
how such a conceptual definition is arrived at is the subject of 
this article, and what follows offers the building blocks for a 
construct of freedom as proffered above. 
 
Freedom –– An Etymological Journey from Negating 
Restraint to Citizenship 
 
The moment in my life that I felt the most free was 
perhaps when I was seventeen.  It was spring break, and two 
friends and I were in a van pulling a waterski boat toward 
Lake Mohave on the California-Arizona border.  The music of 
the rock bands Asia and Journey were blaring as we raced 
down the highway through the desert.  We were going to have 
four days without any parental supervision—my friend’s 
parents were coming out later in the week to join us.  In the 
meantime, we were on our own to waterski, cliff-jump, swim, 
sun bathe, read Louis Lamour novels, or do whatever we felt 
like doing. 
This kind of freedom is what is often referred to as 
 
19. Mode, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 5a (3d ed., 2002).  
20. G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://tinyurl.com/cgnkmq (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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“negative freedom.”21  The restrictions that typically governed 
lives of myself and my friends—mandatory attendance at 
school, the duty to show up for dinner, do nightly homework, 
and keep mom and dad informed of my whereabouts, and of 
course curfews—had been removed.  “We are negatively free to 
the extent to which no one stops us from acting on our 
desires. . . . But there is another, more positive aspect of 
freedom, which is the ability to do certain actions. . . . Someone 
can enjoy negative freedom, but have very little positive 
freedom.”22  In this case, we also had the positive freedom of 
having the keys to the van and the boat, a credit card for gas, 
and some spending money. 
 However, freedom is more complex than simply the feeling 
we get on spring break: it entails complex relationships.  
Etymologically, the English word for free has “the same Indo-
European base as Sanskrit priya beloved, dear. . . .”23  
Furthermore, it compares to “the same Indo-European base 
Sanskrit priyā wife, Old English frīg love, (plural) affections, 
Old English Frīg the name of the goddess Frig (see FRIDAY n.), 
and (in a different declension) Old English frēo woman (rare: 
see note), Old Saxon frī woman, wife.”24  Note that in German 
and Dutch, the word for woman is indistinguishable from 
wife.25  So why does the word free have any etymological 
relationship with dear, love, and wife? 
 
This sense perhaps arose from the application of 
the word as the distinctive epithet of those 
members of the household who were ‘one’s own 
blood’, i.e. who were connected by ties of kinship 
with the head, as opposed to the unfree slaves. In 
the context of wider society only the former 
would have full legal rights, and hence, taken 
 
21. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 61.  
22. Id.  
23. Free, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d. ed., 2008).  
24. Id. 
25. For Dutch, compare the entry for wife with the entry for woman.  
F.J.J. VAN BAARS & J.G.J.A. VAN DER SCHOOT, ENGLES NEDERLANDS 350, 353 
(Het Spectrum 1982) (both are translated as vrouw).  For German, compare 
the entry for wife with the entry for woman.  WÖRTERBUCH: ENGLISH –
DEUTSCH DEUTSCH-ENGLISH 312, 314 (Orbis 1987) (both are translated Frau). 
7
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together, they would comprise the class of the 
free, as opposed to those in servitude. Compare 
the Old English compounds frēobearn free-born 
child, child or descendant of one’s own blood, 
frēobrōðor one’s own brother, frēodohtor free-born 
daughter, daughter of one’s own blood, frēomg 
one’s own kinsman . . . .26 
 
To be freeborn in the old Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon worlds 
was to be “wife born,” and hence not born of a slave, but to be a 
full member of the household and be free.  To be free was not to 
be without family (as in the freedom I felt from my six siblings 
and parents when I was on my spring break vacation at Lake 
Mohave), but to be in relationships of kinship rather than 
servitude. 
This is the same sense in which the Apostle Paul and the 
chief captain of the guard at Jerusalem declared their 
respective statuses (and thus Paul escaped a whipping): “Then 
the chief captain came, and said unto him, Tell me, art though 
a Roman?  He [Paul] said, Yea.  And the chief captain 
answered, With great sum obtained I this freedom.  And Paul 
said, But I was free born.”27  Here, the Greek word, used by the 
captain, for “freedom” is πολιτείαν (pol-ee-ti’-an) “from (‘polity’): 
citizenship: concerning a community . . . .”28  Paul indicates 
that he is “free born” (γεγννημαι from γενος—kindred, nation 
or stock),29 in contrast to the captain who has paid for his 
citizenship.  Historically, freedom has been about relationships, 
not the absence of them.  For the old Anglos-Saxons, freedom 
was about kinship; in the more sophisticated world of Roman-
Judea, the issue was about being part of the polity or 
citizenship of Rome, the city state that ruled what Romans 
perceived was the known world.  The point is that freedom, at 
least etymologically, has required the establishment of strong 
 
26. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 23. 
27. Acts 22:27-28 (emphasis added).  
28. Compare ALFRED MARSHALL, THE INTERLINEAR KJV-NIV: PARALLEL 
NEW TESTAMENT IN GREEK AND ENGLISH, Acts 22:28 (1975), with JAMES 
STRONG, THE EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE OF THE BIBLE, Greek root no. 4174 
(1890, 1980). 
29. Compare MARSHALL, supra note 28, Acts 22:28, with STRONG, supra 
note 28, Greek root nos. 1080 and 1085. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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relationships to institutions and other individuals, and not the 
absence of them.  Indeed, circumstances which promote 
freedom as the absence of responsibilities and duties to others 
are the counterfeit of the ideal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Mayflower compact speaks to this nexus between liberty 
and relationships.  Because the Mayflower landed off course in 
Cape Cod, rather than Virginia territory, colonists argued that 
they would have to enter into an initial compact:30 “That when 
they came a shore they would use their owne libertie; for none 
had power to command them, the patente they had being for 
Virginia, and not for New-england, which belonged to an other 
Government, with which ye Virginia Company had nothing to 
doe.”31  This is a remarkable instance of John Locke’s social 
contract coming into being by virtue of the colonists missing 
their landing zone.  It also illustrates that the nature of liberty 
or freedom is to enter into relationships (in this case, a 
covenant), rather than to avoid them entirely.  Indeed, the 
pledge is “doe by these presents solemnly & mutually in ye 
presence of God, and one of another, covenant & combine our 
selves togeather into a civill body politick. . . .”32  The colonists 
were binding themselves to each other into a political body.  
 
30. BRADFORD’S HISTORY “OF PLIMOTH PLANTATION”: FROM THE ORIGINAL 
MANUSCRIPT 180-81 (Boston Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1898) (1856) (the 
compact, however, dates to 1620).  For source of Figure 2 and an online 
version, see http://tinyurl.com/jm5w234 (electronic version prepared by Ted 
Hildebrandt, 2002). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 182. 
FIGURE 2–MAYFLOWER COMPACT 
9
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Like Paul’s Roman Captain, the essence of freedom was to be 
exercised into creating binding forms of political citizenship, 
rather than escape from obligations (as the first part of the 
compact makes clear by the colonists referencing themselves as 
“loyall subjects” of King James).  The compact is recognition 
that the colonists are not bound by the same conditions they 
would have been had they landed in the territory of Virginia; 
they are, in effect, “free agents” to enter into a new agreement, 
although with some relationship back to the British crown. 
Returning to etymology, in freedom, the suffix –  dom adds 
a legal connotation and is “in Old English dóm, statute, 
judgement, jurisdiction,” and 
 
in Old English as a suffix to n[ouns] and 
adj[ective]s, as biscopdóm the dignity of a bishop, 
cyningdóm, cynedóm, royal or kingly dominion, 
kingdom, ealdordóm the position or jurisdiction 
of an elder or lord; þeowdóm, the condition of a 
þeow or slave; fréodóm, háligdóm, wisdóm the 
condition or fact of being free, holy, or wise.33 
 
Thus, the –  dom in freedom means the condition of being free, 
but it also reflects the jurisdictional aspect of being found to be 
free. 
Being free, then, is not about being released from 
relationships, but about the kind of relationships we bear 
toward one another and the various institutions in our 
societies.  It reflects a particular kind of jurisdiction quite 
different from servitude or that of a sovereign lord. 
Similar to freedom, liberty has an interesting etymology: 
“Anglo-Norman libertee, Anglo-Norman and Middle French 
liberté freedom from constraint or necessity, free will (late 12th 
cent. as livreteit , after livrer liver v.) (in plural) freedoms or 
immunities (accorded to a town, etc.) (1266) . . . .”34  While 
liberty has meant lack of restraint, it has also been used to 
describe the “freedoms and immunities” of the polis or town (or 
the jurisdiction of that town).  Relationships to the community 
 
33. Dom, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1897). 
34. Liberty, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 2010). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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are central to the concept of liberty.  Indeed, this article argues 
that this does not mean the absence of all restraint, and it is 
not in this sense that we should use the term or the word 
freedom when thinking about and discussing the question of 
freedom presented in this article—i.e., does it vary with 
information environment?  Rather, it shall be argued that 
freedom and liberty carry with them relationships to 
individuals and institutions that do in fact vary with the times 
according to the information environment of that time and 
season. 
As we think in more abstract terms, on a larger societal 
scale, freedom manifests itself in different modalities. 
 
Modalities of Freedom –  –Considering Definition 
Elements (1) –  –(4) 
 
Freedom is a state of affairs that can be considered in four 
modalities based on this article’s working definition:  rule of 
law, participatory and representative government, individual 
rights, and social justice.35  These modalities act as different 
lenses through which to view freedom.  Restrict or deny any of 
the elements of freedom described in these modalities as 
follows, and the state of affairs becomes less free. 
 
  
 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
11
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Modality (1) – The Rule of Law and Antithetical 
States 
 
In considering what institutions can do to advance the 
cause of freedom, the presence of the rule of law is a key 
consideration to any analysis.  Societies exist in differing states 
with relation to the rule of law.  Consider the chart in Figure 3 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essentially, any given society’s relationship to the rule of law 
can be described with reference to a plane defined by two axes.  
See Figure 3 above.  Suppose the horizontal axis is rule of will 
(in its most singular form, it is expressed as that of a tyrant, 
whose every whim and fancy, unchecked by law, must be met) 
lies opposite the rule of the mob (for example, a lynch mob, who 
likewise ignores rule of law—the niceties of legal procedures 
and individual rights to expedite its sense of justice or 
entitlement).  The opposite of rule of the will is the rule of the 
many or the mob, and the collapse of order.  I will not call this 
FIGURE 3 – RULE OF LAW AND ANTITHETICAL STATES 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
 2017 WHAT IS MEANT BY FREEDOM? 519 
anarchy because there are philosophical forms of anarchy that 
accept order if free from threat of violence or coercion,36 a 
concept to be elaborated upon later. 
The vertical axis is represented by rule of law (to be 
explained later in what immediately follows) versus the rule of 
power (for example, the rule of money, such as prevails in 
Afghanistan following the U.S. intervention).37  It is 
particularly significant that rule of law lies opposite the rule of 
power.  As shall be discussed later, in its most basic form, rule 
of law represents a check on power,38 and as a corollary 
unlimited power would not be subject to any checks.  
Consequently, the sliding scale is from rule of law to rule of 
power (or the absence of meaningful checks on power). 
Interestingly, in a recent article, Nick Cheesman pointed 
out his dissatisfaction with the problem that rule by law and a 
 
36. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE 
CLASH BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND 
CRASHING THE SYSTEM 4 (2004) (“Anarchists do not oppose or deny governance 
as long as it exists without coercion and the threat of violence.”). 
37. Based on conversation with researcher, Andrea V. Jackson, then 
from the Institute for Rule of Law, Identity, Stability, and Culture, whose 
viewpoint (after considerable time in Afghanistan) is that the country has 
become subject to the “Rule of Money” with the United States being the 
supplier that is distorting government and social structures. 
38. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF 
LAW 65 (2002) (“[T]here is general agreement in China and elsewhere that 
rule of law requires at minimum that the law impose meaningful limits on 
state actors, as reflected in the notions of a government of laws, the 
supremacy of the law, and the equality of all before the law.”).  Rachel 
Kleinfeld also gives significant weight to “checks” on power: 
At its heart, the rule of law is about the structure by which 
the government and governed determine the rules of society 
and hold each other accountable to those rules.  Therefore, 
work to reform the power structure within other countries 
focuses on building the checks and balances on power that 
form the bedrock of a rule-of-law state.  Some of these power 
centers are “vertical”—they check government from below, 
such as through organized groups of concerned citizens, 
religious institutions, and other areas of legitimacy within 
society.  Other power centers are “horizontal”—they might 
provide checks and balances between and within 
government agencies, such as internal investigative units 
among police, or the division of powers between an 
independent judiciary and other parts of government. 
RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW: NEXT GENERATION OF 
REFORM 20 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012).   
13
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related concept, law and order, do not seem to be symmetrical 
or on the same sliding scale that descends from rule of law.39  
“The opposite of law and order is, well, the absence of order.”40  
In Figure 2, the absence of order might be initiated by the rule 
of the mob, but the absence of order is not necessarily the 
opposite of the rule of law.  There might be a rule of someone or 
some will, but without the checks on power of the rule of law.  
Consequently, rule of law and law and order are, in 
Cheesman’s terminology, “asymmetrical opposites.”41 
Furthermore, the fact that rule by law occupies a space 
between the two axes of Figure 2 above, rather than lying 
directly on the rule of law axis, is in harmony with Cheesman’s 
general thesis. 
In the figure, no society finds itself on any of the cardinal 
points.  Rather, they are described in relation to the four 
points.  For example, in the United States, we have rule of law 
(law operates as a check on many abuses of power), but one 
might argue that it is heavily peppered with the rule of money 
(or power), given the cost of running for office.  This is but one 
dimension in the figure.  The United States must also be 
described in terms of the rule of will (whether of one or 
oligarchy) and the rule of themob (or the many).  Although the 
United States can take pride in its democratic tradition, its 
history is littered with examples of the lynch mob.  In contrast, 
in modern day Russia, rule of law may curb some of the worst 
abuses of power, but fear of the FSB (the successor to the KGB) 
and a culture of intelligence gathering operate to concentrate 
 
39. See Nick Cheesman, Law and Order as Asymmetrical Opposite to the 
Rule of Law, 6 HAGUE J. RULE OF L. 96, 107 (2014) (“And so dissatisfied with 
the analytic limitations of the rule-by-law concept, I turn to the last part of 
my argument that law and order is a concept asymmetrically opposed to the 
rule of law . . . .”).  To Cheesman’s question, “What is zero rule of law?” I have 
answered with the “Rule of Power” or the absence of any checks on power.  Id. 
at 106.  Cheesman does not come out and say that rule by law is 
asymmetrical to rule of law, rather he expresses dissatisfaction that this is 
so, and then presents his analysis that law and order are asymmetrical to the 
rule of law, leaving the reader to question whether rule by law and law and 
order are the same or even related concepts. 
40. Id. at 108. 
41. See Cheesman, supra note 39, for reference to “asymmetrical 
opposites.” 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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power in the hands of a few.42  Thus states are described with 
reference to two dimensions, or scales, rather than one.  
Cheesman’s asymmetrical opposites function to provide 
dimension to describe the state of any given society.  A two-
dimensional chart, which separates rule of law and rule of will, 
thus adds significantly to understanding the rule of law and 
related concepts such as rule by law and law-and-order. 
Referring back to the horizontal axis in Figure 2, the rule 
of will is best exemplified by Mao Zedong.  Mao so dismantled 
the legal apparatus of China that there was not even 
appearance of rule by law, let alone rule of law.43  Rule by law 
is the counterfeit of rule of law.  In such instances, law 
operates not as a check on power, but as an instrument to 
impose the will of the sovereign of the day.  In Figure 2, rule by 
law is a function of two scales or axes—rule of law and rule by 
will.  There will be more on rule of law as a cardinal element 
later. 
Finally, there is rule of the mob –  –the lynch mobs of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century.  The problem for the mob 
was always the same –  –if we, the mob, pause for legal 
procedure and allow the accused his or her modicum of human 
rights, there is a good chance he or she might just go free.  
Another example is the democratic assembly of 500 Athenian 
“jurors” who elected to put Socrates to death for corrupting the 
minds of the youth in Athens.44 
  
 
42. See, e.g., Lawyers, Legal Scholars Warn of Erosion of Rule of Law in 
Russia (British Broadcasting Service, Lexis Advance July 28, 2013) (“The 
law-enforcement agencies and security services – the Investigations 
Committee, internal affairs bodies FSB [Federal Security Service], the 
prosecutor’s office – blatantly and sometimes even demonstratively, cynically 
violate the constitutional and other legal norms, including by fabricating 
criminal and administrative cases against those who criticize the 
authorities.”). 
43. PEERENBOOM, supra note 38, at 74 (“The legal system during the Mao 
era, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, was a good example of an 
extreme version, to the point where at times it could hardly be described as 
even a rule-by-law-legal system, which, after all, implies some form of law-
based order.”). 
44. See generally Douglas Linder, The Trial of Socrates (2002), 
http://www.famous-trials.com/socrates. 
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Returning now to the rule of law.  Essentially, the rule of 
law operates to check the most egregious abuses of power.  A 
number of years ago, a “thin theory” of rule of law was 
developed by scholars to try and separate out rule of law from 
democratic practices and western notions of human rights –  
not that these latter practices are inessential to freedom.  The 
point of this theory is that democratic elections and human 
rights are not the only factors contributing to freedom.  There 
is something that law, in particular the rule of law, provides 
that is important and distinctive from democracy and human 
rights.  The thin theory of rule of law consists of a number of 
certain practices:45 
 
45. PEERENBOOM, supra note 38, at 65 (Autumn 2002) (citing FULLER, 
supra note 17, at 39).  Other conceptualizations or lists of the requirements of 
what is known as the “formal version” of the rule of law have been 
formulated.  Lon Fuller’s theory, called “legality” has been summarized as 
“generality, clarity, public promulgation, stability over time, consistency 
between the rules and the actual conduct of legal actors, and prohibitions 
against retroactivity, against contradictions, and against requiring the 
impossible.”  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, 
THEORY 93 (2004) (citing FULLER, supra note 1, at ch. 2).  Joseph Raz listed 
the elements to: 
include that the law must be prospective, general, clear, 
public, and relatively stable.  To this list Raz added several 
mechanisms he considered necessary to effectuate rules of 
this kind: an independent judiciary, open and fair hearings 
without bias, and . . . discretion of police to insure 
conformity to the requirements of the rule of law.  The first 
set of requirements also found in [Friedrich] Hayek and 
[Roberto] Unger, is a standard statement of the dominant 
formal version of the rule of law.  
TAMANAHA, supra note 45, at 93.  See also Paul P. Craig, Formal and 
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, PUB. 
L. 467, 469 (Autumn 1997) (adding a requirement of “access to the courts” 
and clarifies that “the discretion which law enforcement agencies possess 
should not be allowed to undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules”).  
Another prominent author, Judith Shklar, summarizes Fuller’s “inner 
morality” or formal theory of rule of law: “Law must be general, promulgated, 
not retroactive, clear, consistent, not impossible to perform, enduring, and 
officials must abide by its rule.”  JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
POLITICAL THINKERS 33 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998).  A relatively recent 
reformulation by Rachel Kleinfeld, extending beyond “thin theory,” but 
incorporating some of its elements, is: 
Governments are subject to laws and must follow pre-
established and legally accepted procedures to create new 
laws. 
Citizens are equal before the law. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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    Law is based upon procedural rules for enactment and 
made by an institution with authority (to this I would 
add that the thin theory presupposes a shared cognitive 
authority46 – that there are certain touchstones in a 
society, that its members recognize as authority). 
 
    Under the theory, the law must also be transparent, 
public, and accessible (this is where factors such as 
literacy, libraries, and affordable access to legal 
services and published law comes into play).  Law that 
is intermediated by a professional class of lawyers, 
clerics, or priests can operate to either clarify or 
obfuscate the law. 
 
    The law must be general – it must not be targeted to 
the advantage or disadvantage of similarly-situated 
groups – it must generally apply in equal measure to 
similarly-situated groups. 
  
 
Judicial and governmental decisions are regularized:  They 
are not subject to the whims of individuals, or the influence 
of corruption. 
All citizens have access to effective and efficient dispute-
solving mechanisms, regardless of financial means. 
Human rights are protected by law and its implementation. 
Law and order are prevalent. 
KLEINFELD, supra note 38, at 14-15.  Kleinfield’s theory incorporates human 
rights, but I have chosen to treat them separately in this article’s section, 
Modality (3)—Individual Rights.  Kleinfield’s treatment of the subject of Rule 
of Law is an essential read.  However, given the varying formulations of rule 
of law and finding that Peerenboom’s statement of the thin theory of the rule 
of law is the most elaborate, I have used Peerenboom’s elements and 
embellished them for my own formulation of rule of law. 
46. See generally Paul Douglas Callister, The Book as Authoritative Sign 
in Seventeenth-Century England: A Review through the Lens of Holistic 
Media Theory, in LAW, CULTURE AND VISUAL STUDIES 49, 51-54 (Anne Wagner 
& Richard K. Sherwin eds., 2014); Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and 
the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1673 (2000).  
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    The law must be clear and be capable of being 
understood; ironically and hyper-technical areas of the 
law like tax and intellectual property might actually 
serve to undermine rule of law, although providing 
careers for attorneys, law professors, and the 
compliance industries that grow around these technical 
areas. 
 
    The law must be prospective – no ex post facto laws (i.e. 
laws passed to outlaw deeds or omissions that have 
already transpired). 
 
    Laws must be consistent – that is, they must be 
rational.  The great example of a rational field of 
knowledge has always been geometry because of the 
consistent outcomes for innumerable scenarios that 
geometry could produce from five basic axioms or 
postulates.  Of course, rational systems, like geometry, 
have a great weakness, as illustrated by the 
development of non-Euclidean geometries, whereby it 
was possible to produce equally rational (or consistent 
system) by denying some of the postulates or axioms 
(e.g., the shortest distance between two points is not a 
straight line, but a curve or the sum of the angles of a 
triangle is greater than 180 degrees).  Furthermore, 
non-Euclidean geometries proved useful in advanced 
sciences and navigation.  What this suggests for rule of 
law is that just because its basic tenants produce 
consistent results does not ensure that the whole 
system is not arbitrary and that some other rational 
system of law might produce a better, more equitable, 
state of affairs. 
 
    The law must be stable.  Similar to rationalism, 
consistency is part of this element, but beyond that 
question is one for positive law about how frequently 
legislative bodies and courts should change the law.  
Generally, predictability is thought to be the hallmark 
of a good legal system.  Lack of consistency undermines 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3
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this and discourages investment, contracting, 
formation of capital, employment, and the general 
stability of a society.  At the same time, the law must 
be flexible: “[The] [l]aw must be stable and yet it cannot 
stand still.”47 
 
    The law is fairly applied.  Law that is not fairly 
applied, particularly along economic, ethnic, and racial 
lines, produces a distrust of the law among those not 
favored by it.  The support of all classes of society for 
rule of law is essential to its existence. 
 
    The law must be applied as it has been promulgated, 
often in writing.  Interpretation of the law to favor one 
party or another, in the end, undermines law as a 
credible institution. 
 
    The law must be uniform.  We have already discussed 
uniformity in terms of fairness and consistency, but 
there is another aspect in which the law must be 
uniform –  coverage.  The great city of Athens should 
not be said to be subject to the rule of law if all that its 
law governed was parking –  where and when to park.  
Theoretically, a society could be lacking in rule of law –  
crucial codes to punish theft and murder, tort laws to 
cover injury and negligence, etc. – and still have a 
carefully-administered set of traffic and parking laws.  
There needs to be uniformity of coverage. 
 
    The law must be enforced (meaning, the gap between 
law on the books and practice must be narrow).  It is 
fairly obvious that the failure to prosecute murder or 
theft on a regular basis by the state would undermine 
the rule of law.  What does it mean for a state or city if 
no one adheres to traffic laws?  Is there rule of law?  
Thorny subjects include wholesale refusal to enforce 
immigration laws, laws against recreational drug use, 
prostitution, copyright, and intellectual property.  If 
 
47. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923). 
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breaking such laws becomes the norm, then the rule of 
law is threatened. 
 
    Finally, the law must be accepted by a majority of those 
affected.  I remember watching with a mixture of 
horror and bemusement as drivers in New York in 
oncoming lanes refused to stop for red lights that would 
have otherwise permitted cars in my lane from lawfully 
turning left to cross or carry traffic safely.  How could 
there be such whole-scale willful violation of law? 
Assuming this attitude were to multiply to an extent 
that the law, in general, became something to be 
ignored, disrespected, or treated as irrelevant, a serious 
breakdown of rule of law would occur. 
 
The above outline of thin theory, embellished by me but 
present in legal literature since the 1960s, can serve as a useful 
canary in the coal mine for assessing rule of law in a society.  
The theory’s elements collectively operate as a major 
component of freedom because, as a whole, rule of law operates 
as a check on power and the curse of oppression.  Lon Fuller, 
who first outlined this theory, referred to the elements as law’s 
“internal morality,”48 and this served as his rationale for 
rejecting the philosophy of legal positivism,49 a debate about 
which we need not concern ourselves here.  However, these 
elements serve as touchstones of freedom.  Even when 
democratic elections and human rights are absent, the 
elements of thin theory can reveal whether there are checks on 
power—a minimum standard that might serve as one former 
U.S. Army major unofficially put to me: “of a country we can do 
business with.” 
Thin theory is also consistent with Fuller’s article on 
freedom.50  Thin theory’s check on power provides a protective 
barrier for “nullifying restraints”—an element of the requisite 
 
48. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 394 (citing FULLER, supra note 17, at 33-
38). 
49. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 394 (“Contrary to legal positivism, 
therefore, the existence of the law does depend on moral facts.”). 
50. See Fuller, supra note 1.  
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contexts for freedom.51  Acceptance of laws by the majority, the 
law’s consistency, stability, fairness, and uniformity, and the 
recognition of procedural rules for the adoption of laws, all 
support Fuller’s requirement for a congenial environment for 
rules and decisions.52  We should hardly be surprised, however, 
that Fuller is consistent with himself. 
Returning to the two axes and law coordinates in Figure 
2—rule of will, rule of mob, rule of law, rule of power— every 
society finds itself somewhere on this plane, but none are 
represented by a single coordinate. 
Some interesting combinations arise in relation to the 
different axis points.  Tribal societies often have rigid codes of 
honor, but may function more by rule of the mob –  in the sense 
that obligation of kinship or groups supersede allegiance to 
laws of the state, even when enacted through duly-elected 
representatives.  The tribes envisioned by the chart are not 
those held together as personality cults behind strong central 
leaders, but rather by tradition and law in a decentralized 
environment with competing and coexisting tribes operating 
under similar principles of law and custom.  On the opposite 
side of the chart, tyranny and oligarchy operate with apparatus 
of the state in a centralized environment. 
Extreme manifestations of the welfare state, where votes 
are bought in exchange for the promise of social benefits, may 
be represented in a quadrant dominated by demagoguery, 
mobocracy, and power.  The essence of demagoguery is when 
powerful individuals or groups use the money, media, and 
other forms of power to win support of the masses to effect rule.  
The problem is that rule by the masses or the mob can be 
inherently unstable and unpredictable.  Mobs are, by their 
nature, unruly, demanding and fickle.  Kitty-corner on the 
diagram, rule of law becomes rule by law when it ceases to 
operate so much as a check on power and becomes an 
instrumentality to execute the will of a supreme sovereign or 
clan of oligarchs.  Rule by law is a counterfeit of rule of law –  it 
has rules, but no real checks on power. 
 
51. Id. at 1314; see also supra text accompanying note 16. 
52. See generally Fuller, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying 
note 16. 
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There are a number of exchanges that operate in this plane 
as well.  Those who rule by will may exchange some form of 
identity (the hopes, dreams, sense of belonging, historical 
territorial claims, and aspirations of people) for loyalty of the 
masses.  This exchange has been discussed at length in my 
earlier articles on the Market for Loyalties.53  Power holders 
(the wealthy, military, and those in charge of domestic 
intelligence agencies) are willing to exchange rule of law in the 
forms of some checks on this power in exchange for 
legitimacy.54  Indeed, it is often in the interest of all states to 
pursue rule of law as a pathway to legitimacy, and thus a way 
to consolidate their rule. 
 
Modality (2)—Democracy and Representative 
Government 
 
Most of us remember our high school civics lessons on the 
virtues of democracy and republican forms of government.  But 
the subject is far from stale or static.  Like changes in 
information environments in the past, the Internet is 
challenging how we think about and implement democratic and 
representative forms of government in new communal contexts.  
An important work in this area is The Anarchist in the Library:  
How the Clash Between Freedom and Control is Hacking the 
Real World and Crashing the System by Siva Vaidhyanathan.55  
Vaidhyanathan describes the Net in terms of community – a 
community that is governed not by hierarchically proscribed 
laws, but by communal protocols.56  Indeed, such an approach 
allows Vaidhyanathan to take anarchy seriously—not anarchy 
 
53. See generally Paul D. Callister & Kimberlee Everson, Analysis of 
Freedom of Information for its Effect on Society by Considering 2011, the Year 
of the Arab Spring, 6 INFO. L.J. 36 (2015); Paul D. Callister, Identity and 
Market for Loyalties Theories: The Case for Free Information Flow in 
Insurgent Iraq, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 123 (2006); Paul D. Callister, The 
Internet, Regulation and the Market for Loyalties: An Economic Analysis of 
Transborder Information Flow, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. POL’Y 59 (2002).  See 
also Market for Loyalties Theory, WIKIPEDIA, http://tinyurl.com/hso245v (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2017) (explaining market for loyalties theory). 
54. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 38, at 126. 
55. See generally VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36. 
56. See id. at 33-38. 
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in the sense of violent overthrow of the government, but an 
approach that rejects the need for centralized authority.  It 
instead recognizes the role of Web protocols, mavens, and peer-
to-peer networks in not just building the Web,57 but in 
facilitating new organizational structures for society.  This is 
an anarchy reminiscent of the “social anarchism” described in a 
well-known article by Peter Coy—violence against the state is 
not its defining feature.58  Rather, in an essay by Herbert Read, 
“the main consideration in any political philosophy should 
therefore be the preservation of individual freedom. . . . Such 
freedom, I argue, can only be preserved in small communities, 
free from a central and impersonal exercise of power  . . .”59  It 
is, rather, a rejection of government, particularly a centralized 
government that is the common theme.  “Peace is anarchy.  
Government is force, force is repression, and repression leads 
to reaction, or to the psychosis of power which in turn involves 
the individual in destruction and the nations in war.”60  It is 
this kind of anarchy to which Vaidhyanathan refers as he 
describes the Net. 
  
 
57. See id. at xvi-xvii and 12-21. 
 58. See Peter E. Coy, Social Anarchism: An Atavistic Ideology of the 
Peasant, 14 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD AFFAIRS 133 (1972).  
“[T]errorism is a form of government and the abolition of government is what 
Anarchism is all about.  Moreover, even Lenin recognized that pamphlets 
were more effective agents of social change than firearms.”  Id. at 136.  Coy 
does not appear to totally eschew violence, at least in his idealized 
description of a Mexican highland village, where there are limits on the 
practice of religion, or lack thereof, enforced by incarceration:  
Villagers are permitted by their fellows to vary in quantity 
and quality of their piety according to their needs and 
means.  There is only one minimal standard: that no one 
within the community public demonstrate his disbelief; he 
who dos so, whatever his power and position is likely to find 
himself thrown into village lockup . . . .   
Id. at 146.  Apparently, religion is coopted by anarchist philosophy, and so 
the complete denial of it is not tolerated.  See id. at 145-46. 
59. HERBERT READ, ANARCHY AND ORDER: ESSAYS IN POLITICS 25 (1971). 
60. Id. at 121. 
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In some of Vaidhyanathan’s new structures, scholars 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have identified, on an 
international scale, as transnational advocacy networks.61  “By 
building new links among actors in civil societies, states, and 
international organizations, they [advocacy groups] multiply 
the channels of access to the international system . . . By thus 
blurring the boundaries between a state’s relations with its 
own nationals and the recourse both citizens and states have to 
the international system, advocacy networks are helping to 
transform the practice of national sovereignty.”62  This is a 
fairly important change to the international order of things, 
which has traditionally been viewed as billiard balls that may 
hit and knock each other about on their surfaces, but which do 
not have relations internally.63  Notably, the United States 
currently favors the role of nongovernmental “stakeholders” in 
governing the Net, rather than the dominance of governments 
favored by Russia and China.64  The change means that many 
more of us have a voice in the international system; the places 
to vote are increasing.  From the prospective of freedom, the 
change challenges us—having a voice in each of the 
communities to which we belong may mean democracy has 
become more complex, multilayered, and dependent on status 
in the respective communities. 
Returning to networks, many of these transnational 
advocacy networks have special expertise and, in the words of 
John Gerald Ruggie (who borrows from Michael Foucault), are 
 
61. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 2-4 (1998).  See 
also Eric Dannenmaier, Lawmaking on the Road to International Summits, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
62. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 61, at 1-2. 
63. Alex Prichard, Anarchy, Anarchism and International Relations, in 
CONTINUUM COMPANION TO ANARCHISM 96, 101 (Ruth Kinna ed., 2012) “This 
‘billiard ball model’ of international relations presents world politics as 
consisting of hermetically sealed states with no linkages between them, 
ricocheting off one another, with the largest bouncing the hardest and 
invariably swallowing up smaller ones like in some epic interplanetary 
collision.” Id. 
64. See Unified Internet at Stake in UN Negotiations, ELECTRONIC COM. 
L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), Aug. 26, 2015. 
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“epistemic communities”65 because they are built around 
“bureaucratic position, technocratic training, similarities in 
scientific outlook and shared disciplinary paradigms.”66  The 
global nation-state system has moved from communicating 
exclusively through diplomats to communication through 
members of epistemic communities, and the Net has been at 
the heart of this change.  In some instances, the field of 
democracy may be expanding, and the Net is primed to 
facilitate such changes.  Freedom requires that the right be 
heard, and that each of the stakeholders have access to a 
forum. 
In the end of Anarchist in the Library, after reviewing the 
power of the Net to both enhance swarming mobs and 
oligarchical structure, Vaidhyanathan calls for civic 
republicanism—in his case, meaning a Net whose most 
egregious abuses of property rights (copyright and trademark) 
are curbed, but at the same time governed by institutions run 
by people who hopefully are accountable to the netizens who 
find community and freedom in the domain we call the Web.67  
Recall that citizenship is fundamental to freedom in our prior 
discussions of the etymology of freedom. 
What is so fundamentally different about the Web is the 
use of private ordering,68 including protocols and individual 
contracts (much like the ideals of John Locke), to create 
communities that transcend national borders and traditional 
legal jurisdictions.  Protocols are distinguished from codes by 
Vaidhyanathan because they are not imposed by hierarchical 
authorities but are reached by consensus.69  For example, the 
standards for HTTP, HTML and CSS, the open access protocols 
for browsers as of the time of this writing, were reached by 
consensus through an organization (really a community of 
experts, an “epistemic community”), known as W3C.70  If a Web 
 
65. John Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: 
Concepts and Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 569 (1975). 
66. Id. at 570. 
67. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 188-92. 
68. For use of term “private ordering,” see Margaret Jane Radin, 
Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 142 (2004). 
69. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 16-21. 
70. See W3C STANDARDS, http://www.w3.org/standards/ (last visited Feb. 
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surfer uses these protocols correctly, Internet browsers will be 
able to interact with his or her Web documents—otherwise, he 
or she is excluded from participating on the Net, or rather of 
being part of the technical conversation that is part of the Net.  
The same is true in international law.  If ambassadors fail to 
present certain credentials and follow protocols, no dialogue 
between nations can occur.  One nation state does not have 
sovereignty over another simply because its ambassadors 
follow international protocols, nor has it exercised or 
threatened force to compel action of the other state; rather, by 
using protocols, states can participate in the international 
order.  In the digital environment, protocols are distinguished 
from controls in that they, like law, dictate compliance.  
Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig has authored at least 
two books pointing out the vulnerabilities of code to constrain 
behavior on the Net.71  Net Delusions author Evgeny Morozov 
makes similar claims.72  As Vaidhyanathan puts it, “if a 
protocol is a handshake, a control is a full nelson.”73  The point 
is this: protocols provide an alternative to subjugation of 
controls whether embedded in computer code or in diplomatic 
communications of the sovereign. 
What Vaidhyanathan has also observed, by taking 
anarchical communities seriously, is that creative and cultural 
efforts prosper in such environments as proffered by the Web; 
however, he also finds that the Web enables the negative 
aspects of anarchy, such as swarming to commit acts of violent 
protest at international events such as the 1999 WTO summit 
in Seattle—”‘smart mobs’ are still mobs.”74  Instead, what 
Vaidhyanathan calls for is discussion within a framework of 
Cultural Democracy and Civic Republicanism, the former being 
 
14, 2017). 
71. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).  
72. See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF 
INTERNET FREEDOM (Public Affairs 2011). 
73. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 33. 
74. See id. at 188.  Like the WTO protests in 2011, originators of the 
Occupy Wall Street Movement planned to use “swarming” techniques, 
particularly after the Zuccotti Park was cleared.  See Mattathias Schwartz, 
Pre-Occupied:  The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall Street, THE NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/j7lpbme.  
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a liberal environment permitting creative use and reuse of 
materials on the Internet, and the latter being a recognition of 
the responsibilities that go with citizenship and membership of 
any community.75  For Vaidhyanathan, it is about culture, and 
a fundamental belief that cultural development thrives in 
environments with liberal borrowing or imitation of what has 
become ensconced in intellectual property. 
Another maven of cyberspace, Harvard Law Professor 
Lawrence Lessig, likewise makes the case for providing a 
liberal cultural environment on the Internet; Lessig argues for 
“remix culture.”76  In carefully choreographed multimedia 
speeches broadcast over the Internet, Lessig argues that prior 
to radio, society enjoyed a “read-write” culture with respect to 
music.  New tunes were passed from performer to audience, 
who, in turn, performed, modified, and passed along the work 
to others.  Lessig quotes John Philips Souza for support that 
the “talking machines” had a negative effect on the 
development of culture, in particular music.77  These “infernal 
machines” facilitated the movement toward a write-only 
culture, where the producers of music and programing were 
narrowly proscribed and centralized.  Now, after the age of 
radio, phonograph records, and the eight-track tape recorder, 
an age when the public could only read (or listen) to what was 
given to it, the Internet has brought society back to the age of 
read-write culture.  But, warns Lessig, this state of affairs is 
only the case because the code underlying the Net 
(Vaidhyanathan would have used the word “protocol”) permits 
this to be so.78 
The question of the modern era is whether the extremes—
rule of the mob and oligarchy, or even autocracy—are 
 
75. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 188-92. 
76. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN 
THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY (2004). 
77. Lawrence Lessig, Laws that Choke Creativity, TED TALKS: IDEAS 
WORTH SPREADING (Mar. 2007), http://tinyurl.com/as32o9. 
78. Tarleton Gillespie, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF 
DIGITAL CULTURE 189 (2007) (quoting LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE, supra note 71, at 43-44) (“[I]t is not hard for the government to 
take steps to alter, or supplement, the architecture of the Net.  And it is those 
steps in turn that could make behavior of the net more regulable.”).   
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facilitated at the expense of democratic and republican forms of 
government.  This article will review this issue, but at the 
same time, the question of Democracy and Republicanism is 
not the only mode for consideration of freedom—as already 
mentioned, the rule of law, and as yet to be mentioned human 
rights and social justice, need to be considered in the analysis. 
In so far as autocracy goes, this is philosopher Martin 
Heidegger’s nightmare.  Heidegger had been a Nazi prior to 
World War II, but his philosophy in later years came to be 
informed by his experience; he expressed a deep distrust of the 
drive of all things, particularly technologies, toward a single 
will.79  In a state of a single will, law may still exist, but it is 
reduced to that of other goods and commodities.  It is simply 
“instrumental” to the single will.  Such a state is known as 
autocratic “rule by law.”  In such a state, even people are 
reduced to be commodities and instrumentalities of the single 
will—this was Heidegger’s nightmare. 
In short, democratic institutions will be challenged by the 
Web.  At the same time, the possibility for exerting one’s voice 
in a broader range of institutions has increased.  This is exactly 
the result Fuller sought in his context number 2—”the 
presence of some appropriate form of order that will carry the 
effects of individual decision over into the processes of 
society.”80  We will need to work hard to keep the democratic 
propensity alive and in line with Fuller’s objectives for a free 
society.81  Fuller even criticizes Mill’s essay on freedom for not 
recognizing the need for “arrangements” to facilitate choice: 
“Mill seemed strangely blind to the fact that in all significant 
areas of human action formal arrangements are required to 
make choice effective.”82  We might see those “arrangements” 
as the “protocols” of the Web, the stateless institutions that dot 
 
79. Paul D. Callister, Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning 
Technology: Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 
286-90 (2007). 
80. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
81. See Gjelten, supra note 7 (arguing that the threat of a free and open 
society on the net to totalitarian regimes and their efforts to make the net 
less open).   
82. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1312.  “[Mill] generally retains . . . the notion 
that the forms of social order are a kind of unfortunate necessity and that 
freedom consists in their absence.”  Id. at 1312 n.3.  
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the landscape of the new international order, or institutions as 
old as the ballot box. 
There is one other aspect of modality (2) that must be 
treated in this section: “by which [democratic and 
representative] arrangements the individual’s actions may 
from time to time be legitimately directed.”83  The direction of 
the individual was important to Fuller.  He justified it because, 
assuming democratic institutions, “we must draw the man 
whose freedom is in question into consultation; we must afford 
him some participation in the decisions that affect the practical 
significance of his freedom.”84  It is natural to think of such 
participation in legislative function, but Fuller significantly 
includes judicial functions because litigants are included 
through their attorneys.85  The role of law and institutions in 
effectuating individual choice is further addressed in the final 
section of this paper below.86 
 
Modality (3)—Individual Rights 
 
We live in an age when a single philosophy has challenged, 
and in large measure rejected, the notion that rights can exist 
apart from commands or legislative political action (which 
includes constitutional ratification and amendment) in the 
form of some higher law or moral principle.  This philosophy is 
called legal positivism, and it has been embraced by much 
liberal thinking.  Certain luminaries like John Austin, Jeremy 
Bentham,87 and H.L.A. Hart propounded a theory that 
explained all rights, including those articulated by courts, as 
“convention,” “command,”88 or “enacted by existing political 
authority.”89  “It would never be sufficient to point out that so-
and-so is the morally legitimate authority, that people have 
 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
84. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1315. 
85. Id. 
86. See infra text accompanying note 105. 
87. See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 9 (Jules 
Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds. 2002). 
88. Id. 
89. Legal positivism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
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inalienable rights, that certain texts are sacred, or that a given 
interpretive methodology produces the best results from the 
perspective of public policy.”90  Essentially, there was no higher 
moral authority or natural law to which one could appeal as a 
source of freedom.  Regardless of such thinking, a well-
regarded legal philosopher and critic of legal positivism, Ronald 
Dworkin, maintained the primacy of individual rights, in 
among other works, of Taking Rights Seriously.  For Dworkin, 
certain political rights trump the power of other legislated acts: 
 
So a claim of political right is a claim to a trump 
over the general welfare for the account of a 
particular individual . . . We emphasize the 
special injustice of torture, for example, when we 
speak of a right against torture, because we 
claim that torture would be wrong even if it were 
in the general interest. But it is appropriate to 
speak of a right not to be tortured even when 
torture would serve only private or illegitimate 
interests.  Torture in this latter case is wrong a 
fortiori.91 
 
Assuming a perfectly democratic society, a legal right 
should exist against torture without having to legislate it—at 
least the argument is so strong that it is the burden of anyone 
(Jack Bauer from the hit show 24 included) to demonstrate 
that this is not the case. 
It is policy that has given us “enhanced interrogation 
techniques,” but Dworkin’s trumps are rooted in principle 
rather than policy: 
 
I call a ‘principle’ a standard that is to be 
observed, not because it will advance or secure 
an economic, political, or social situation deemed 
desirable, but because it is a requirement of 
justice or fairness or some other dimension of 
 
90. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 102. 
91. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 431 (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2013). 
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morality. Thus the standard that automobile 
accidents are to be decreased is a policy, and the 
standard that no man may profit by his own 
wrong a principle.92 
 
Policies express the will of the majority and are utilitarian 
in nature, smacking of the “general welfare.”  They are the 
backbone of positivism.  The dilemma for rooting individual 
rights in principle (meaning something other than the 
expressed policies of the majority) is that it directly challenges 
democratic fiat and raises many questions about how such 
principles are to be discerned and who is qualified to do so?  It 
gives rise to the issue of judges “making law.”  What is to limit 
the will of the majority being overturned?  Grounding rights in 
principles and natural law is exactly what Jeremy Bentham 
referred to as “nonsense upon stilts,”93 but that is precisely 
what Dworkin does in his attack on positivism.  The success of 
Dworkin’s attack rests on a fortiori cases such as the rule 
against torture—ironically, a not unheard-of dilemma in 
modern times with the American government’s use of 
waterboarding against terrorists.  For positivists, a 
government’s actions speak louder than moral principles. 
For us, the question is more subtle: are we any less free if 
our society rejects the idea of rights based upon moral 
principles rather than legislative, judicial, or executive fiat?  
Perhaps it is the case that checks on power, the essential 
element of rule of law, is more potent when grounded in 
principle because they are less likely to be changed by the 
operation of legislative, judicial, and executive processes; 
however, such principles must be interpreted by such 
processes, and these interpretations may change over time.  In 
any case, for Fuller’s concept of freedom, the absence of 
“nullifying restraints” is imperative.94  Whether based upon 
principle or legislative, judicial, or executive fiat, the important 
thing is that rights operate as trumps on unmitigated power. 
 
 
92. Id. at 39. 
93. Ross Harrison, Jeremy Bentham, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 87 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).  
94. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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Modality (4)—Social Justice 
 
The modalities of freedom would not be complete without 
contemplating John Rawls’ work on social justice.  Nor is there 
a better guarantee of the last part of our definition—”that the 
general welfare or social justice is sufficiently observed that the 
exercise of fundamental rights and privileges is meaningful, 
but not suppressed by attempts to serve the general welfare or 
social justice”—than the lexical ordering of rights introduced by 
Rawls.95  The modern liberal framework for discussing 
individual rights has been through the lens of social justice as 
described by John Rawls and a host of legal scholars who have 
engaged his theories.96 
Rawls is most noted for his consideration of justice as 
fairness and his separate treatment of basic liberties (freedoms 
to vote, hold office, of conscience, etc.) and social values 
(income, opportunity, and wealth).  In his original formulation 
of the principle of basic liberties, “each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”97  
Before social values or “goods” could be considered, basic 
liberties had to be equal.  Under his theory, it would not be just 
to restrict basic liberties even if it meant that a more equitable 
distribution of social values could be achieved.  He referred to 
this as a “lexical ordering,” meaning that individual access to 
equal liberties had to be satisfied prior to any consideration of 
social welfare.98 
 
95. See supra text accompanying note 18 (specifically, definitional 
element (4)). 
96. The significance of Rawls’ work is hard to overstate:  
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is a modern classic and its 
impact on contemporary legal thinking has been profound.  
One indicator of the work’s influence is the staggering 
number of law review articles citing A Theory of Justice.  
Another measure is its frequent citation in opinions of 
American courts—a phenomenon that is unduplicated by 
any other twentieth-century work of political philosophy.   
Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549, 
550-51 (1994) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). 
97. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 302.   
98. Id.  
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For instance, suppose there were two groups of people, A 
and B, and that it were possible to quantify their basic liberties 
and their material benefits in society.  Possible scenarios for 
the division of liberties and benefits might look like the 
following:99  
TABLE 1 
 
 Even though structure II maximizes social goods for both 
groups (25 for A and 50 for B), it is unacceptable because basic 
liberties are unequal (group A only gets 9 while group B gets 
11).  Equality among basic liberties (as represented by the first 
value, before the slash) has to be achieved first before 
maximization of social goods can be considered.  In this 
instance, structure III is the superior and morally just 
arrangement.  To illustrate further, suppose there were a class 
at an elementary school for which some of the parents paid 
tuition and some, due to indigent circumstances, did not.  
Suppose further that all of the children were allowed to run for 
and vote for various class offices—class president, hall monitor, 
newspaper editor, etc., but that due to budget limitations, 
packages of Crayola had to be divided up differently.  Students 
from families who did not pay tuition got a pack of ten Crayolas 
for the year, but students from families who paid full tuition 
would get the box with thirty Crayolas.  For Rawls, this is a 
just arrangement.  It preserves incentives to pay tuition—your 
child gets a bigger box of Crayolas—but still preserves 
 
99. See FRANK LOVETT, RAWLS’S ‘A THEORY OF JUSTICE’ 46, fig. 3.1 (2011). 
 
Alternative Structures of Liberties/Social Goods 
Citizen Group I (Group A/B) II (Group A/B) III (Group A/B) 
Group A 10/10 9/25 10/15 
Group B 10/10 11/50 10/20 
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fundamental liberties—running and voting for class office—as 
equal.  If, on the other hand, the school had decided to hand out 
equal boxes of Crayola (say, boxes of twenty Crayolas each) to 
every child, regardless of whether his or her parent paid 
tuition, but incentivize the payment of tuition by restricting 
running for office to children of tuition-paying parents, the 
arrangement would fail Rawls’ basic test because running for 
office is a political right (assuming that value is to be 
inculcated in grade school) is lexically prior to the division of 
Crayolas as resources. 
Now for purposes of this article, what is interesting is 
whether we are talking about the division, not of Crayolas, but 
of the allocation of library books or time on the Internet (e.g., 
non-tuition paying students can check out one book per week 
and have no Internet access, but full tuition students can check 
out as many books as they want and are entitled to one hour 
per day on the Internet).  Where books and the Internet fall in 
Rawls’ formulation—as fundamental liberties or social goods—
is important because the former is lexically prior, meaning it 
must be satisfied first with equal distributions, and the latter 
permits differences in allocations.  Consequently, how we think 
about books and information media (whether they should be 
treated as lexically prior or as secondary) is critical in 
determining whether access and availability of such media in 
society is just and fair—i.e., a prerequisite for freedom.100 
Rawls’ theory can turn freedom (particularly “freedom to”) 
on its head by exalting as the first lexical imperative “freedom 
from” values.  If the first lexical imperative is freedom from 
hunger or freedom from fear, and other freedoms, like freedom 
to speak, play a secondary role in the lexicon, Rawls’ system 
creates a society that may not satisfy the other elements of this 
article’s definition or Fuller’s framework.  Certain rights, like 
freedom of assembly and worship and freedom of speech, may 
 
100. While the right to information is not expressed in the United States 
Constitution, it is more than the aspiration of librarians and is expressed 
under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
provides “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers” G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, at art. 19 (emphasis added), 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
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no longer serve as effective trumps under the third modality for 
freedom if lexical prioritization is not arranged with them as 
the highest priority.101  Nor, under the first modality, will there 
be the “thin theory” protection of like-people generally treated 
alike under the law—one can imagine a situation of equality of 
“freedom from” hunger, but not “freedom to” speak.102  The role 
of hunger in relation to fundamental rights is not to be lightly 
cast aside.  The International Declaration of Human Rights 
provides in Article 3 for the “right to life.”103  Argument can be 
made that “freedom from” starvation flows from it.  The point is 
Rawls’ lexical prioritization has to have resolved the hierarchy 
of rights and values and that resolution must comport with the 
overall definition of freedom, particularly modality (3) on rights 
as trumps.  In other words, there has to be congruity between 
the modalities.  Nonetheless, there is room for considerations of 
social justice—of opportunity and oppression—but with Rawls’ 
lexical prioritization demanding a hierarchy of rights, Fuller 
advocating the ascendancy of “freedom to” values, and Dworkin 
requiring rights to operate as trumps on government action, 
even at the expense of social welfare.  Hence the formulation of 
modality (4) of the definition, “the general welfare or social 
justice is sufficiently observed that the exercise of fundamental 
rights and privileges is meaningful, but such rights and 
privileges are not suppressed by attempts to serve general 
welfare or social justice.”104 
 
 
  
 
101. See supra notes 82-86. 
102. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra note 20.  Article 1 also bears upon the question providing 
that humans are “equal in dignity,” something that poverty denies. 
104. See text accompanying supra note 18. 
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Law as Social Planning—The Institutional 
Imperative for Freedom 
 
My cousin returned from two years as a missionary in the 
Dominican Republic.  He described the rules of the road as “you 
don’t want to hit me, and I don’t want to hit you, so let’s make 
a deal.”105  More correctly, my cousin was describing the 
absence of rules of the road, and the phenomenon that occurs 
in this absence is constant negotiation.  The problem is that a 
state of constant negotiations is inefficient.  Per a recent book, 
Legality, by Scott Shapiro,106 what should result is a kind of 
social planning that produces laws or rules of the road, and 
which reduces the inefficiencies of constantly negotiating what 
side of the road to drive on, who has to yield to whom, what to 
do at a crossing, how fast to drive, etc.  Now, in all likelihood 
these rules do exist in the Dominican Republic, but they are 
ignored in favor of private negotiation.  Further shedding light 
on the sad condition, my cousin reports instead of stopping at 
stop signs that cars honk twice while proceeding directly 
through the intersection, that police frequently try to flag down 
motorists to solicit bribes, and that motorists routinely ignore 
such commands.  A preference to avoiding corrupt police can be 
easily understood, but the question remains why Dominicans 
seem to prefer private negotiations to traffic rules established 
by the state—rules which should be favored under Shapiro’s 
thesis. 
Before exploring plausible answers to that question, we 
need to understand a great deal more about Scott Shapiro’s 
contributions in Legality.  His theory represents a form of 
positivism that might be called “Plan Positivism,” which he 
combines with planning theory—really a theory that legal 
activity is an activity of social planning.107  Shapiro develops a 
narrative of a wonderful community springing out of a cooking 
club, evolving into a business, going public on the stock market, 
selling out their interests, buying an island, and rapidly 
 
105. Conversation with James Barton Callister after return from 
mission to the Dominican Republic in the 1990s. 
106. SHAPIRO, supra note 17. 
107. Id. at 178, 195. 
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evolving a sophisticated government through “nested planning” 
on what becomes known as “Cook’s Island.”  In Shapiro’s 
narrative, government is not an evil necessity resulting from 
bad men—the contention made by the likes of James Madison, 
Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume,108 but rather Shapiro’s 
island develops in a happier atmosphere with planning powers 
being delegated, because it is simply more efficient to delegate 
planning authority than to have an environment of constant 
bargaining and consensus forming activity: 
 
[I]t is extremely costly and risky for people to 
solve their social problems by themselves, via 
improvisation, spontaneous ordering, or private 
agreements, or communally, via consensus or 
personalized forms of hierarchy.  Legal systems, 
by contrast, are able to respond to this great 
demand for norms at a reasonable price.  
Because hierarchical, impersonal and shared 
nature of legal planning, legal systems are agile, 
durable, and capable of reducing planning costs 
to such a degree that social problems can be 
solved in an efficient manner.109 
  
 In other words, even in a society of all good actors, legal 
systems (and presumably the rule of law) would arise because 
it is just not efficient to keep negotiating how order is to be 
maintained.  Shapiro’s narrative and theory run on the 
necessity of efficiency.  This is what Fuller calls for when he 
identifies in his framework of freedom the need for the 
“presence of some appropriate form of order that will carry the 
effects of individual decision over into the process of society.”110  
Law and social planning also legitimize the second half of 
modality (2), concerning “by which arrangements the 
individual’s actions may from time to time be legitimately 
directed.”111 
 
108. See id.at 173-74. 
109. Id. at 172. 
110. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1314. 
111. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
37
 544 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
Returning to the Dominican Republic and the constant 
negotiation while performing the task of driving—the “you 
don’t want to hit me, and I don’t want to hit you, so let’s make 
a deal— the question arises:  why do individuals who have such 
chaotic traffic reject any scheme of rules of the road and prefer 
a situation of constant negotiation?  The answer may be 
cultural or as simple as frustration with a lack of resources.  
The Dominican Republic has about 519 people per kilometer of 
road, compared to forty-nine people in the United States.  It 
also has four times the number of traffic deaths per 100,000 
people.  The following table is illustrative:112 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 
Something is wrong with the Dominican Republic.  While 
it is true that it is a very densely populated country, this alone 
does not account for the fact that Dominicans prefer bargaining 
while driving instead of conforming to established laws 
 
112. See THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/h9xdl2h (last updated 
Nov. 4, 2013); see also Wikipedia, List of countries by traffic-related death 
rate, http://tinyurl.com/h2surkj (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (based upon WHO, 
GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON SAFETY 2013, at http://tinyurl.com/cza7qbj). 
Country	
Populatio
n per KM 
of Road	
Population 
per KM of 
Paved 
Road	
Population 
per Square 
KM of 
Land	
Traffic 
Deaths per 
100,000 
inhabitants	
Bahamas 117.42 204.51 31.87 13.7 
Cuba 181.77 370.96 100.73 7.8 
Dominican 
Republic 518.63 1,035.21 211.50 41.7 
Netherlands 120.64 Unavailable 495.83 3.9 
United 
States 48.67 72.38 34.56 10.4 
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dictating rules of passage and yielding while driving on 
Dominican roads.  The Netherlands have more than twice the 
population density, and, having lived there for a year, I can 
attest that they have a very good traffic system, one governed 
by law and order.  The fact that really stands out is that 
Dominican Republic simply does not have enough roads, 
particularly paved roads, to support its large populations.  This 
may result from poor planning, lack of resources to build the 
roads, or most likely a combination of the two factors.  
Astonishingly, the effect is not only measured in traffic 
congestion and deaths, but in a whole scale abandonment of 
following the basic rules of the road.  Indeed, we might even 
conjecture that based upon Shapiro’s theory, the Dominican 
Republic suffers from a lack of the rule of law.  Interestingly, a 
World Bank Report, amalgamating various indices and 
measures of the rule of law, places the Dominican republic in 
the range of 30% (see Figure 3), whereas The Bahamas have 
declined from the high 80s to the 70% range in the last decade 
(see Figure 4 below).113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3—WORLD BANK RULE OF LAW AGGREGATE 
INDICATOR: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 
113. The rule of law statistics were generated from the World Wide 
Governance Indicators, Interactive Data Access, at http://tinyurl.com/ox6pocp 
(select “Country Data View,” “Rule of Law,” “All Years” and compare 
“Dominican Republic” and “Bahamas, The”).  Copies of the download report 
are on file with the author. 
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FIGURE 4—WORLD BANK RULE OF LAW AGGREGATE 
INDICATOR: THE BAHAMAS 
  
 The United States has maintained a score in the low 
90s.114  Shapiro’s thesis that law is a planning activity designed 
to more efficiently transact what individuals do on a day-to-day 
is consistent for the Dominican Republic (where adherence to 
such planning appears to be non-extant or severely limited) 
and other aggregate measures of the rule of law showing a 
breakdown of rule of law in the Dominican Republic by no less 
a prestigious institution than the World Bank. 
Returning to Shapiro’s planning thesis—that law can be 
described as a kind of planning activity—one has to wonder 
about the stark contrast of idealistic, non-Hobbesian 
community in Shapiro’s narrative (perhaps best represented on 
the chart of  the Bahamas) and whatever is going on in the 
Dominican Republic that makes it such a dangerous place to 
drive.  Can it all be explained by the reputed preference of 
Dominican’s to “make a deal” while driving, rather than 
adhering to any system of formal traffic laws?  Perhaps the 
Dominican’s state of affairs can be reduced to some sort of 
failure in planning, as evidenced by the sheer congestion of the 
roadways (e.g., five times as many people per mile of paved 
roads as the Bahamas).  Also important is the failure to adhere 
to such planning as evidenced by the Dominicans driving 
 
114. The rule of law statistics were generated from the World Wide 
Governance Indicators, Interactive Data Access, at http://tinyurl.com/ox6pocp 
(select “Country Data View,” “Rule of Law,” “All Years” and select “United 
States”).  Copies of the download report are on file with the author. 
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behaviors (constant negotiations, honking, instead of stopping, 
at stop signs, and waiving off police commands). 
Not all planning or even social planning, according to 
Shapiro’s thesis, is legal activity, nor is all activity that 
produces norms legal activity.  Simply planning roadways is 
not legal activity.  However, activity is legal activity if it “(1) 
produces norms that are supposed to settle, and purport to 
settle, questions about how to act; (2) dispose addressees to 
obey; and (3) is purposive, that is, has the function of producing 
norms.”115  In the Dominican Republic, assuming there had 
been efforts to plan traffic laws, what is missing is element (2), 
the dispositive element: “All legal philosophers agree that legal 
systems exist only if they are generally efficacious, that is, they 
are normally obeyed.”116  In the Dominican Republic, the 
fundamental element of efficacy of traffic law is missing.  This 
translates not simply into a suggestion of failed legal activity 
following Shapiro’s theory, but based upon our earlier 
discussion of the elements of thin theory, the final element is 
missing—the law must be accepted by a majority of those 
affected.117  It is not, in the words of Fuller, a “congenial 
environment of rules and decisions.”118 
Furthermore, legal planning imposes certain 
characteristics, such that, as quoted above, “[b]ecause 
hierarchical, impersonal and shared nature of social planning, 
legal systems are agile, durable, and capable of reducing 
planning costs to such a degree that social problems can be 
solved in an efficient manner.”119  This is relevant to this 
article’s concept of freedom.  As discussed above, it is only 
through relationships that freedom is actualized.  Those 
relationships include the citizenship, community, and the 
establishment of officials and institutions that can effectively 
regulate the affairs we so often take for granted and which 
occur so regularly in common life.  Otherwise, life would be full 
of constant negotiation and transacting business for the most 
 
115. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 201. 
116. Id. at 202. 
117. See supra note 45 (with reference to the final, enumerated bullet 
point). 
118. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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common of events, driving, disposing of trash, establishing 
what rights go with property, etc.  In a sense, we are freer in a 
complex world because legal activity has interposed itself to 
take over the mundane. 
 
Summary 
 
Freedom does not mean the absence of restrictions.  It is 
not summed up in the Constitution or its Bill of Rights.  It is a 
complex concept best viewed in different modalities: Rule of 
Law, Democracy and Representative Government, Individual 
Rights and Social Welfare.  In considering these modalities, 
this article has also considered the framework for freedom 
tendered by Lon Fuller and attempted to answer his question:  
“How can the freedom of human beings be affected or advanced 
by social arrangement, that is, by laws, customs, institutions, 
or other forms of social order that can be changed or preserved 
by purposive human actions?”120  Consequently, this article has 
not contented itself with discussion of restraints and their 
absence but has always kept institutions, including law as an 
institution, in mind. 
Returning to the definition of freedom, rule of law is 
perhaps foremost in its modalities because it considers the 
checks on power as creating the space necessary for free choice.  
Even before the Bill of Rights was enacted, the Constitution 
contained checks and balances to limit power.  Long before the 
American Constitution, the Magna Carta limited the power of 
the English monarch in relation to the noble classes and “free 
men.”121  Per the “thin theory” rule of law, a list of basic 
elements, such as procedures for making rules, access to law, 
and no ex post facto laws, are used as evidence of rule of law.122 
Also with respect to rule of law, states may be represented 
 
120. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1309.  
121. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER, & BRUCE P. SMITH, 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 123-24 (2009).  “No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned or 
disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way victimized, neither will we 
attack him or send anyone to attack him, except by the lawful judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land.”  Id. at 125. 
122. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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as existing on a plane, with Rule of Law being one of the 
cardinal points, and Rule of Mob, Rule of Power, and Rule of 
Will.  Rule by Law is a counterfeit of Rule of Law.  Certain 
exchanges occur where by states give into certain checks on 
power in exchange for legitimacy.  Furthermore, power holders 
trade identity in exchange for loyalty.  It is within this plane 
formed by the cardinal points that freedoms are permitted and 
restricted by the realities of power or the absence thereof. 
Democracy and representative government will be 
important considerations in many of the information milieu, 
but our current digital age has created particular challenges in 
that the Net enhances the power of both oligarchs and 
anarchists.  The trick is how to balance the powers of the Net—
on the one hand to continue the creativity that has been 
unleashed by allowing users to remix and publish their own 
content, and on the other to restrict the abuses of copyright law 
and “swarming”—the phenomenon whereby mob activity is 
coordinated by the Web.  The challenge is how to preserve a 
liberal democratic scheme that will promote creativity and 
instill a sense of civic republicanism that will promote a kind of 
citizenship or netizenship (the essence of freedom) on the Net. 
As the last modality, law and social justice has been 
considered.  There are so called positive freedoms—freedoms 
that can occur only because there are sufficient resources and 
opportunity.  The leading theorist in the field for the last fifty 
years has been John Rawls.  Rawls argues for a Pareto 
optimization; however, before social values or “goods” could be 
considered, basic liberties had to be equal.123  The fundamental 
question remains as to what those basic liberties should be and 
how information environments affect outcomes under the 
theory.  For instance, how would a potential right to 
information (such as under article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights)124 be treated under Rawls’ 
theory? 
This article has also given consideration to a new theory 
from Scott Shapiro arguing that law is a type of social planning 
involving officials that purports to settle questions about how 
 
123. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
124. G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, at art. 19.   
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to act, that disposes obedience from citizens and subjects, and 
that is purposive in producing norms.125  This new theory most 
closely aligns to the rule of law modality, and in particular thin 
theory, as discussed above.  What is important is that the most 
recent jurisprudential theorist has described a theory that 
aligns with the rule of law modality, regardless of whether we 
accept or reject positivism.  The point being that rule of law 
may be foremost among the considerations when contemplating 
freedom in relation to jurisprudence and law. 
In the end, what does freedom mean?  It means 
citizenship.  It posits relationships rather than restraints, and 
it orders them in ways harmonious to both society and the 
individual.  May humanity’s aspirations for freedom burn long 
and bright, regardless of milieu, as defined by information 
technologies and other challenges. 
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